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 
Abstract— This paper discusses results from a recent 
study that investigates certification requirements for an 
unmanned rotorcraft performing agricultural 
application operations.   The process of determining 
appropriate requirements using a risk-centric approach 
revealed a number of challenges that could impact larger 
UAS standardization efforts.  Fundamental challenges 
include selecting the correct level of abstraction for 
requirements to permit design flexibility, transforming 
human-centric operational requirements to aircraft 
airworthiness requirements, and assessing all hazards 
associated with the operation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Airworthiness certification is one of the most important 
regulatory approvals typically needed for aircraft to operate 
commercially in the National Airspace System (NAS). 
Airworthiness encapsulates the notion that an aircraft meets 
established design requirements and is in a condition for safe 
operation. Developing airworthiness requirements for 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that enable a new range of 
missions, designs, and operational modes that pose novel 
risks is a key challenge to the safe integration of UAS into 
the NAS [1].  
NASA recently completed an exploratory research study 
on risk-appropriate airworthiness requirements for a midsize 
UAS performing low-risk, precision agriculture application 
operations [2]. The goal was to facilitate development of 
airworthiness requirements for a UAS that would not 
qualify: (a) under the anticipated small UAS (sUAS) rules 
[3], (b) for an exemption under the FAA’s Section 333 [4], 
(c) under EASA’s ‘open’ category [5], or (d) under current 
conventionally piloted, civil aircraft standards.  The research 
study employed a hazard-based approach to establish design 
requirements that would form a mock type certification basis 
[6] for an unmanned agricultural sprayer. This paper outlines 
the study’s results and describes the broader implications 
these results may have on UAS design standards and 
certification processes under more general circumstances.    
The next section outlines the precision agricultural 
research study and summarizes part of the mock certification 
basis.  Section III details the procedure used to evaluate 
design standards in Part 27 of Title 14 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (14CFR) [7] for selection and 
aggregation into abstracted requirements more appropriate 
for a UAS platform. Requirements for UAS features needed 
to perform historically human-centric functions, such as 
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minding operational boundaries (i.e., containment) and 
avoiding other aircraft and obstacles, are excerpted in 
Section IV.  Related technical work is identified in Section 
V, with insights and conclusions discussed in Section VI. 
II. BACKGROUND 
UAS intended to operate beyond the limitations imposed 
on small UAS [3] will likely require some degree of 
airworthiness certification in addition to operational 
approvals [1,8]. Airworthiness certification processes for 
aircraft typically involve compliance with design and 
performance standards found in 14CFR.  These standards 
include requirements on the aircraft structure, controls, 
powerplant, electrical and other systems. The requirements 
are meant to forestall the loss of the aircraft hull, thus 
protecting all persons onboard. The standards have the 
additional effect of protecting overflown persons and 
property on the ground below. 
Application of existing airworthiness standards to UAS 
could be problematic because the hazards mitigated by those 
standards may not be the same as those for UAS [9, 10].  
Risk posed by a UAS is driven by its concept of operations 
(ConOps), more so than for conventionally piloted aircraft 
(CPA) whose ConOps is assumed to be the point-to-point 
transport of goods or persons [5].  The following subsections 
provide a quick overview of the research study components 
indispensible to the mock type certification basis. 
A. ConOps and UAS Description 
The ConOps for the research study targets the precision 
agricultural application operation.  Precision spraying 
represents a feasible early application for larger UAS (>55 
lb) due to the low-risk nature of the operation and strong 
economic projections [11].  
1) Precision Agricultural Application 
In the research study, a midsize, remotely-piloted 
rotorcraft is used to spot treat crops in fields up to 160 acres 
in rural, sparsely populated areas [2]. Operations can be 
conducted under daytime, nighttime, and reduced visibility 
conditions.  Operations can also occur within and beyond 
visual line of sight (VLOS), but always within radio line of 
sight (RLOS).  Operations only occur within Class G 
airspace [2]. 
Spray operations are limited to a designated operational 
boundary (Fig. 1, yellow lines) around the field, and an 
absolute containment boundary (Fig. 1, red lines) just 
beyond the operational boundary.  The containment volume 
includes the altitude dimension with the boundaries.  A 
priori knowledge about crop health is used to identify 
treatment areas (Fig. 1, dashed white lines).  The unmanned 
rotorcraft is expected to operate a few feet above crop 
height, with a maximum altitude of 400 ft.  Constraining the 
operation to a well-defined volume, restricted in altitude and 
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inhabitants, is key to limiting operational risk.  Procedures or 
automated systems must be in place to ensure constraints are 
met [12]. 
 
Figure 1. Containment volume bounding spray operation 
2) UAS Description and Mission Assumptions 
To develop a credible certification basis, a representative 
example of a UAS that could meet the mission requirements 
from the ConOps was needed.  The platform selected was 
the DP-14 from Dragonfly Pictures, Inc. [2], a tandem rotor, 
single turbine, prototype rotorcraft with: 
 Maximum Takeoff Weight  1000 lbs  
 Maximum endurance  2.4 hrs  
 Maximim airspeed  100 kts 
 No manual control reversion mode 
The goal of the research study was to develop a candidate 
set of design requirements for a UAS with characteristics 
and capabilities similar to the DP-14. The design 
requirements, posed in the form of a mock type certification 
basis [6], are intended to be sufficient to mitigate hazards 
arising from the precision aerial application. 
B. Approach 
Airworthiness standards for new or novel aircraft are 
typically derived from existing standards, with any 
additional requirements for unique features incorporated as 
special conditions.  These existing standards (e.g., Part 23, 
25, 27, 29 and 33) focus on aircraft systems and equipment, 
with minimal consideration being given to the operational 
context of the vehicle.  However, UAS enable a wide range 
of operations and  numerous novel design features. 
The ConOps and associated operational limitations of a 
UAS strongly influence the severity of the consequence of 
its failure. This is especially true for limited-range 
operations such as those associated with agriculture. 
Following the development of the ConOps, there were three 
subsequent major tasks involved in investigating 
airworthiness requirements for the selected UAS platform:  
(1) identifying and prioritizing hazards; (2) evaluating the 
applicability of existing Part 27 regulations; and (3) 
generating UAS-specific requirements.  Figure 2 outlines the 
research approach taken, including the relevant tasks 
performed, the products produced by each task, and how 
these products relate to the content of the mock type 
certification basis.  
 
Figure 2. Research Approach Overview 
1) Identification and Prioritization of Hazards 
The requirements in the mock certification basis were 
determined by the identified hazards and their associated 
risks.  The first task was to identify hazards that could cause 
harm to people or property. These include UAS-specific 
hazards associated with the failure of aircraft functions and 
operational hazards associated with the mission and crew. 
Traditional aircraft hazards such as loss of control and loss 
of navigation were considered. New hazards related to the 
ConOps, such as loss of containment (i.e., exceeding the 
virtual boundary for the operation) were also considered.  
Hazards were then prioritized, with respect to severity and 
likelihood.  The severity definitions as outlined in the FAA 
Advisory Circulars were tailored for use in this study, 
leading to the retention of 15 primary hazards to be 
mitigated [2].  The goal of the hazard assessment for this 
research was not a definitive assessment of severity for each 
hazard, but a broader evaluation of whether the potential 
consequences of a hazard necessitate a design or 
performance requirement comparable to those in Part 27. 
2) Evaluating Applicability of Part 27 Requirements to 
UAS Platform 
The second task was to specify reasonable design and 
performance requirements for the UAS platform. The Part 
27 regulations for normal category rotorcraft provided a 
practical starting point.  Each regulation in Part 27 was 
evaluated for applicability to the UAS platform and 
associated ConOps, with respect to the 15 primary hazards.  
This effort identified Part 27 regulations that apply “as is” to 
mitigate the primary hazards, those that apply with some 
simple modifications, and those that may not be applicable 
at all.  The paragraphs accepted “as is” and those that 
were modified constitute the main set of requirements in 
the mock type certification basis.  A summary of the basis is 
included in Section II-C. 
Many other Part 27 paragraphs could not be easily placed 
into one of those three categories.  The relevant content from 
these Part 27 requirements were generalized or ‘rolled-up’ 
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into broad sets of requirements that focus on preservation 
of the rotor system to prevent harm from release of high-
energy debris and explosion.  The generalization process  is 
described in Section III. 
3) Generating UAS-Specific Requirements 
Lastly, the primary hazard list was reviewed to identify 
hazards for which Part 27 contains no applicable 
requirements. Four primary hazards that are not covered by 
Part 27 were identified:  (1) loss of vehicle containment (i.e., 
a failure causing a fly away event where the unmanned 
aircraft (UA) leaves the operational area); (2) failure to 
detect and avoid people on the ground; (3) failure of safety-
critical command and control (C2) links; and (4) failure to 
detect and avoid other aircraft.  The first three hazards are 
not addressed in any of the FARs, but the last hazard is 
related to standards for aircraft operators (Part 91).  Section 
IV describes issues encountered in the development of a 
selection of these requirements.  A summary of the mock 
certification basis is provided in the next subsection. 
C. Summary of Research Study Results  
 
Figure 3.  (a) Disposition of Part 27 Requirements in 
mock type certification basis (b) ‘Rolled Up’ Requirements 
Current airworthiness regulations in 14CFR Part 27 for 
normal-category rotorcraft were evaluated to determine their 
suitability for mitigating hazards for the unmanned 
agricultural sprayer.  Figure 3 illustrates the degree to which 
the Part 27 requirements were incorporated into the mock 
certification basis1.  
Many Part 27 requirements are very prescriptive: their 
constraints and assumptions limit design flexibility.  Such 
requirements relate to issues of:        (1) controllability, 
maneuverability, and stability (CMS), (2) structural integrity 
(SI), and (3) powerplant and supporting systems (PSS), and 
are designed to avoid hull loss.  The general intent of many 
requirements in those areas is relevant to unmanned aircraft; 
those requirements were ‘rolled-up’. The ‘rolled-up’ 
requirements are a novel feature of the mock certification 
basis, and are further discussed in Section III.   
The Part 27 requirements do not address all of the hazards 
posed by the unmanned sprayer.  Unaddressed hazards 
included those associated with functions typically performed 
by a conventional aircraft pilot, including loss of separation 
 
1 The mock type certification basis, issue papers and any proposed 
requirements do not represent US Government or FAA policy or guidance.   
from other aircraft and ground-based objects (obstacles and 
people) and failure to stay within the authorized operational 
area. Developing design requirements to mitigate those 
hazards is discussed further in Section IV. 
III. ABSTRACTED REQUIREMENTS DERIVED FROM PART 27 
TRADITIONAL AREAS 
The design and operational differences between a 
medium-sized unmanned rotorcraft and a normal category 
manned rotorcraft are such that many of the requirements in 
Part 27 are either not applicable or overly prescriptive for a 
vehicle that has no humans onboard. The ConOps played an 
important role in the analysis of hazards and risks, which 
was the basis for deciding which of the Part 27 requirements 
may be relevant.    
A. Approach 
The approach used to derive an appropriate set of vehicle- 
and ConOps-specific requirements relied on conducting a 
hazard analysis that identified aspects of the UAS and the 
operational environment that can compromise safety. Fifteen 
primary hazards were identified [2], and each Part 27 
requirement was evaluated to determine whether it aided in 
hazard mitigation.   
In several instances, many requirements jointly 
contributed to the mitigation of a single hazard.  This was 
especially true in the areas of CMS, SI, and PSS. In each of 
those topics, select requirements were aggregated and 
replaced by more abstract requirements focused on 
mitigating UAS-specific hazards. Each aggregated 
requirement emphasizes a safety objective without unduly 
constraining the UAS design space. For any particular 
design, an applicant and the regulator would then refine the 
abstracted requirements into specific, concrete requirements 
for the UAS presented for certification. The hazard analysis 
and condensed airworthiness requirements would be 
supplemented by appropriate operational limitations that 
would not be part of the airworthiness certification basis, but 
would be contained in appropriate operational approvals.  
An example of this approach is provided in III.B. 
B. Example of Approach 
Consider two sample identified hazards: (1) loss of 
structural integrity of the rotor system and (2) explosion.  
Both hazards could result in the release of high-energy 
debris beyond the containment boundary, consequently 
harming people on the ground, including UAS crew.   
The hazard pertaining to loss of structural integrity of the 
rotor system can be traced to four primary causal events that 
should be mitigated or avoided:  
 Contact of the rotors with the ground, each other, 
obstacles, or other parts of vehicle 
 Loss of structural integrity of primary structure 
supporting rotors or critical elements of rotor system 
 Loss of structural integrity of rotor drive system  
 Sudden engine stoppage resulting in loss of rotor 
(a) (b) 
  
system integrity 
A single Part 27 requirement was included in the mock 
certification basis to prevent the sudden engine stoppage 
event:  
14CFR §27.917 Design [7] 
(a) Each rotor drive system must incorporate a unit for each 
engine to automatically disengage that engine from the main 
and auxiliary rotors if that engine fails. 
The DP-14 satisfies this requirement by using a clutch, 
which disengages the rotor from the engine if the engine 
fails.  Mitigating the other three events is less 
straightforward. An example of the requirements abstraction 
process is given in III.C. 
C. Controls, Maneuverability, and Stability Requirements 
A total of 38 individual Part 27 paragraphs were 
abstracted, either in whole or in part, into an issue paper in 
the certification basis that describes abstracted requirements 
for CMS to avoid ejection of high-energy parts.  An excerpt 
from the CMS issue paper is as follows [2]:  
The applicant must: 
(a) establish controllability and maneuver-ability design 
margins that prevent contact of the vehicle rotors with the 
ground, other parts of the vehicle structure, or obstacles in 
normal and non-normal operations, or any other condition 
that could compromise rotor system integrity…  
An example of a specific prescriptive Part 27 requirement 
that was ‘rolled up’ into the abstracted requirement above is 
as follows [7]: 
14CFR §27.51 Takeoff 
The takeoff, with takeoff power and r.p.m. <revolutions 
per minute> at the most critical center of gravity, and with 
weight from the maximum weight at sea level to the weight 
for which takeoff certification is requested for each altitude 
covered by this section— 
(a) May not require exceptional piloting skill or 
exceptionally favorable conditions throughout the ranges of 
altitude from standard sea level conditions to the maximum 
altitude for which takeoff and landing certification is 
requested 
… 
The CMS issue paper captured many of the Part 27 
requirements related to controllability, maneuverability, 
static stability and piloting requirements. Several of these 
Part 27 requirements establish characteristics of control 
systems in terms of pilot handling characteristics, which are 
not directly applicable or easily translatable into automation 
requirements.  
Note that the CMS issue paper touches on the first causal 
event (contact of rotors with ground, obstacles, vehicles, 
etc.), but does not establish a means by which an autopilot 
can be judged as ‘compliant’.  The abstract requirement 
defines a general mitigation whereby a compliant system 
must establish the appropriate design margins in their 
control systems (as well as maneuverability guarantees) to 
explicitly prevent an actuation that leads to the initiating 
event. 
 
Similarly, CMS requirements related to the design of the 
rotor drive and structural integrity of the control system 
elements were ‘rolled up’ into an abstracted requirement. An 
excerpt [2]: 
The applicant must: 
(b) ensure that flight control commands from all 
sources (stability augmentation system, autopilot 
etc.) are passed to the appropriate flight control 
surfaces without hazardous flexure, slop, friction, 
jamming, interference or other hazards that would 
lead to loss of rotor system integrity 
… 
This requirement directly addresses the causal events 
relating to a loss of structural integrity: either of critical 
elements of the rotor system and support structure, or the 
rotor drive system. The relevance of these requirements 
comes from their ability to mitigate the hazard associated 
with the ejection of high-energy parts (and not hull loss, as 
they were originally intended). An example of a specific 
prescriptive requirement on the control system is as follows 
[7]: 
 14CFR §27.685 Control System Details  
(e) Control system joints subject to angular motion must 
incorporate the following special factors with respect to the 
ultimate bearing strength of the softest material used as a 
bearing: 
(1) 3.33 for push-pull systems other than ball and roller 
bearing systems. 
(2) 2.0 for cable systems. 
… 
Paragraph §27.685 is geared towards maintaining vehicle 
hull integrity and protecting any human occupants.  
However, as hull loss is not a primary concern for 
agricultural operations, the appropriateness of special 
engineering design factors should be negotiated with the 
applicable hazards and risks in mind (e.g., parts ejection).  
The fact that many of the most prescriptive requirements 
were abstracted does not mean that they do not apply at all, 
only that they be considered in their risk-context.  
The proposed use of abstracted requirements in areas 
where current regulations are highly prescriptive is not 
novel.  A similar approach is used for Light Sport Aircraft 
regulation [13], and the Part 23 Reorganization Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee is working to replace prescriptive 
requirements with safety objectives that are design-
independent to extend the range of applicability [14]. The 
novel contribution is that the type certification basis is 
directly tied to hazards that are relevant to the UAS and its 
ConOps, forming a risk-centric approach.  The correct 
choice of abstract requirements enables flexibility, while 
maintaining safety. 
The next section addresses further difficulties in choosing 
the correct level of abstraction to define airworthiness 
requirements that originate from operational requirements 
for CPA. 
  
IV. NOVEL UAS-SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS 
Several hazards whose mitigation are traditionally the 
responsibility of a pilot were identified during the research 
study, including: (1) loss of separation with other aircraft, 
obstacles, or people and (2) failure to confine the operation 
to the authorized areas (e.g., a fly-away event). There are no 
airworthiness requirements in Part 27 that address these 
hazards, since they are traditionally operational requirements 
(implicit or explicit) [16]. This section examines proposed 
requirements for functions to avoid obstacles and aircraft 
(detect-and-avoid functionality), and for a function to limit 
egress from the operational area (containment functionality).  
A. Detect and Avoid (DAA) 
The ability of the UAS to detect and avoid other aircraft 
as well as ground-based obstacles is of paramount 
importance, even when operations are restricted to a low-
altitude containment volume.  For a CPA, the onboard pilot 
performs this function, called ‘see-and-avoid’, by 
maintaining situational awareness through looking outside 
the aircraft’s windows.  The notion of ‘see-and-avoid’ is 
described under several regulations in 14CFR Part 91 [16], 
most notably as follows: 
14CFR §91.113 Right-of-way rules: Except water 
operations. 
 (b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless 
of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight 
rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by 
each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid 
other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another 
aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that 
aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless 
well clear. 
Other Part 91 operational regulations imply that the pilot 
must also see-and-avoid ground obstacles.  For example, 
14CFR Part §91.13 prohibits careless or reckless operations 
that could endanger the life or property of others, and 
14CFR §91.119(d) describes minimum altitudes for 
rotorcraft operations, provided they do not create a hazard to 
people or property on the surface.  
A UAS must perform an equivalent function, either 
through airborne or ground-based systems, likely in an 
automated fashion.  Regulatory certification of this function 
would be expected, as its failure could create a catastrophic 
hazard.    Thus, a function that would conventionally be 
handled by operational regulation in Part 91, will now be 
handled for UAS, at least in part, by airworthiness 
regulation. Note that the ‘see-and-avoid’ function is 
specified quite abstractly.  Trained human pilots employing 
‘common sense’ interpret it uniformly and execute it well 
enough to achieve safety.  Once this function becomes 
(partially) automated, these ‘common sense’ assumptions 
and pilot insights must become explicit, as overly abstract 
specifications are no longer adequate. 
The mock type certification basis included two issue 
papers proposing airworthiness requirements for detecting 
and avoiding aircraft and obstacles.  A sample requirement 
from the issue paper on ground-based obstacle DAA is as 
follows: 
…[The applicant must] Provide a means to detect and 
avoid persons and objects within the defined operational 
area during flight operations. 
(a) Means of detection will:  
(1) have sufficient range in the direction of Unmanned 
Aircraft (UA) travel to permit a simple avoidance 
maneuver (e.g., hovering or landing);  
… 
Note that the detection requirement does not specify 
whether the detection action is performed by a human or by 
automation, it merely provides bounds on performance 
characteristics (e.g., sufficient range in the direction of UA 
travel). Sufficient time is based on the notion that the 
avoidance action must have enough time to complete its 
avoidance maneuver.   
The proposed requirements were deliberately written in a 
way so as to guarantee safety without prescribing a 
particular implementation.  Neither the architecture, nor 
sensors, nor algorithms, nor human-automation function 
allocation is prescribed by these requirements.  
 
Table 1:  Potential Architectures for Ground Obstacle 
Detection and Avoidance 
Architect
ure 
Ground Based  
(Ground Control Station)  
Airborne 
(UA) 
 Function Automation
/ Human 
Function 
Ground 
Only 
Sense, 
Detect, & 
Avoid,  
Y/Y* None 
Ground 
Decision 
Detect & 
Avoid 
Y/Y Sense 
Split 1 Avoid Y/Y Sense & 
Detect  
Split 2 Sense & 
Detect  
Y/Y* Avoid 
Air-
based 
Status Y/N Sense, 
Detect, & 
Avoid,  
* under visual meteorological conditions 
Table 1 describes several possible function allocation 
schemes for the DAA capabilities needed for ground based 
obstacle avoidance.  Broadly speaking, DAA can be broken 
down into three main functions:  (1) obstacle sensing; (2) 
conflict detection; and  (3) avoidance maneuvering.  These 
functions can be allocated to either an airborne agent (e.g., 
autonomous capability onboard the UA), or to a ground 
based agent (ground based automation or human).   For 
example, under the Ground Decision architecture, the 
sensing function is provided by the airborne agent (e.g., 
LIDAR or camera onboard the UA).  The sensing 
information is then communicated to the ground control 
station (e.g., via video feed), where the conflict detection 
  
function is performed.  Note that this function can be 
performed either by automation or by a human agent (as 
indicated by the Y/Y in the Automation/Human column).  
Similarly, either a human agent or automation can perform 
the ground-based avoidance maneuver generation function.  
The sensing function can be performed on the ground by a 
human agent such as a visual observer or pilot in command 
(e.g., Ground Only and Split 2 architectures). However, this 
is only possible under visual meteorological conditions, as is 
indicated by the asterisk following the Y notation. 
In the course of migrating human-centric operational 
requirements into potential requirements for automation, 
care must be taken not to over-prescribe the system, thereby 
eliminating potential architectures that allow a variety of 
human-machine functional allocations.  A high level of 
abstraction, as well as ambiguous wording (e.g., “sufficient 
time”) is acceptable when the implementation involves a 
trained pilot.  However, concretized requirements are 
required when this function is implemented through 
automation to ensure there is no room for ambiguity or 
unspecified interpretation. This design-agnostic approach, as 
well as the difficulties encountered in translating human-
centric requirements into automation-oriented requirements, 
is mirrored in an issue paper on containment, discussed in 
the following subsection. 
B. Containment 
One of the primary hazards of concern in UAS operation 
is that of a ‘fly-away’: that is, the pilot in command of the 
UA is unable to affect control of the aircraft and the aircraft 
is no longer following its preprogrammed procedures, 
resulting in the UAS not operating in a predictable or 
planned manner.  A ‘fly-away’ could result in the UA 
entering an area in which it is not permitted to operate, 
and/or behaving in a manner that is hazardous to other 
aircraft or persons on the ground.  For example, on August 
2, 2010, an MQ-8 “Fire Scout” became unresponsive to 
commands during testing and entered protected airspace 
around Washington, D.C. [37].   
While there is no explicit requirement in 14CFR that 
states that an aircraft should only operate where authorized, 
there are Part 91 operational requirements stating where 
aircraft should not operate (e.g., in restricted areas per Part 
§91.133) [16]. Thus, there is a recognized concern regarding 
UAS operations taking place beyond designated operational 
boundaries, especially due to a loss of the control link [15].  
Hence, an issue paper was included in the mock type 
certification basis that proposed requirements specifically 
regarding the enforcement of the UA’s position with respect 
to the containment boundary.   Note that, like the ‘detect-
and-avoid’ issue papers, the issue paper on containment puts 
forward suggested airworthiness requirements that were 
previously proscribed by operational regulation.  Difficulties 
encountered in section IV.A regarding the translation of 
human-centric requirements into automation-oriented 
requirements apply. 
The issue paper on containment covers a number of 
important obligations to prevent fly-away events, including 
knowledge of vehicle position relative to the boundaries, 
ability to detect impending boundary violations, and the 
actions needed to prevent exit. For the research study, an 
independent assured containment system [12], combined 
with systems and procedures for ensuring that the 
containment area remains clear of persons, was proposed.   
An assured containment system is a localization system 
that acts to keep the UA within given bounds using one or 
more strategies such as return to containment area centroid, 
hover, or terminate flight.  The assured part of the assured 
containment concept comes from being able to build a safety 
argument, sufficient for certification purposes, that the UA 
will remain in a specified area in the presence of common 
vehicle, autopilot, sensor and actuator failures.  
Implementing the assured containment system as a separate 
system isolated from the UA primary avionics facilitates 
achieving high dependability and might ease certification.  It 
is this system (and component) independence that is the 
principle difference between geofencing and assured 
containment.  Furthermore, geofencing acts to detect 
boundary violation on the behalf of the vehicle, while the 
predictive nature of assured containment can actively keep 
the vehicle localized or contained within the containment 
volume. 
A partial requirement for the containment function is as 
follows [2]: 
…[The applicant must] Provide a means to detect and 
avoid transgression of any containment boundaries 
established for the operation.  This includes the following…. 
 (c) Failure of infrastructure not part of the UAS (e.g., 
Global Positioning System (GPS), cell phone network) must 
not significantly interfere with the determination of the 
location of the aircraft.  
… 
To meet requirement (c), the containment system should 
not not rely upon GPS or the UA autopilot system and 
avionics.  No single failure in the UA’s autopilot system 
should result in an automatic failure of the containment 
system.  Hence, there should be no critical coupling between 
the containment system and the UA’s primary onboard 
avionics systems (all flight termination systems are 
redundant, independent mechanisms). A primary value of 
the containment concept comes from being able to limit the 
UA’s physical location in the presence of failures in the 
primary avionics. 
An architecture for an assured containment system is 
proposed in Figure 4, and incorporates an independent 
system for determining the location of the UA based on 
three or more low power transmitters prepositioned to 
provide good multi-lateration geometry over the operational 
area. The UA contains two receiver/processors preloaded 
with lateral and vertical containment boundaries. The 
receiver/processors receive signals from antennas on the 
vehicle and continuously triangulate to determine current 
  
lateral and vertical position. The current position is 
differentiated to determine a velocity vector.  The position 
and velocity data are processed to determine a projected time 
to crossing of the boundary.  If the UA has not taken action 
to adjust its path or speed to stay within the boundaries by 
the projected crossing time, the proposed containment 
system forces the vehicle into an immediate landing by 
closing an emergency fuel shutoff valve. The valve operates 
completely independently of the UA primary systems, 
including primary and backup power sources.  An activation 
signal is sent to the operator via C2 datalink and the operator 
reinforces the automatic action with a command to close the 
normal fuel shutoff valve. 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Proposed Containment Implementation 
The precision of the vehicle localization system (sensors, 
filters and positioning algorithms/processors), the fidelity of 
the algorithm by which impending boundary violations are 
detected (algorithms and processors), and the means by 
which avoidance maneuvers are executed (controls 
algorithms and processors, actuators and communications 
links/delays) must all be considered in evaluating the 
assurance case for the containment concept (Figure 4). 
A further requirement for containment is: 
 (g) …containment system design must consider 
projection of parts that may constitute a hazard to 
bystanders outside the containment area. 
The size and shape of the containment volume is affected by 
the potential trajectories of parts that may be ejected by the 
vehicle.  Vehicle speed and altitude must be considered in 
the containment system design since they affect the 
trajectory of ejected parts.  Note that this is the same hazard 
described in Section III.B-C.  
The need for requirements to prevent harm from the 
release of high-energy parts was not initially obvious. A 
crash of an unmanned agricultural sprayer within a 
containment area that has been cleared of people might not 
be considered a safety concern. However, further 
consideration of such a crash resulted in identifying hazards 
related to the release of high-energy parts that could exit the 
containment area (e.g., rotor blade), as well as hazards 
related to detecting people who may enter the field during 
the operation.  Hence, a key observation of this work is that 
mitigations for one hazard may mask or influence another 
hazard.  That is, the CPA mitigation of the hull loss hazard, 
through the application CMS and SI requirements, acts to 
mitigate the hazard posed to persons on the ground by the 
ejection of high energy parts in the event of a crash. 
Consequently, efforts to mitigate a hazard must ensure that 
the effects of this mitigation mechanism on all other hazards 
are clearly understood.   
The containment requirements that are proposed allow 
considerable design flexibility.  Thus, under visual 
metrological conditions, the containment function could be 
implemented using visual observers stationed along the 
containment boundary, along with a reliable means of 
communication, and a remote pilot who can trigger the 
emergency fuel cutoff valve. Hence, human-automation 
function allocation is not constrained. 
There has been a great deal of fundamental research 
focusing on the fields of geospatial containment, DAA and 
CMS functionality.  In order to place this work in context, a 
brief survey is performed in the next section. 
V. RELATED WORK 
A. Containment 
A current idea often proposed to control the overflown 
area of UAS or rockets is that of geofencing [17, 18].  
Geofences for UAS are primarily implemented via software 
in conjunction with the UA’s autopilot; thereby using the 
same sensors, actuators and processor as the vehicle’s 
primary autopilot/control system [19]. The computational 
platform upon which the autopilot is implemented, as well as 
the underlying operating system and communications 
architecture is relevant to the safety of the geofence [20].  
Fault tolerance in sensor and actuator architecture and 
components is also relevant if they impact safety critical 
functions [21].   Given that many UAS and their autopilots 
are composed of commercial-off-the-shelf products (some 
even open source), reaching levels of reliability and design 
assurance sufficient for airworthiness certification may be 
difficult to achieve [22-23]. 
B. Detect and Avoid 
One of the most restrictive and important issues in the 
integration of UAS into the NAS is the lack of automated 
detect and avoid systems for UAS [24-25].  These systems 
can roughly be divided into ground-based detect and avoid 
systems, such as [26-27], and airborne ones, such as [28-29]. 
A radar-based collision avoidance approach is presented in 
[30] along with potential requirements parameters for UAS. 
Vision-based systems are a popular solution to providing 
detect and avoid ability for small UAS due to size, weight, 
and power limitations [31]; however, the limited avoidance 
  
time available, unknown object motion (and size) and large 
relative geometries (scale) create significant observability 
issues [21]. Automating this process requires balancing 
expectations on sensor limitations with aviation procedures 
[22, 31]. 
C. Controls, Maneuverability and Stability 
A primary point of focus for the design of CMS systems 
for UAS relates directly to trajectory generation for the 
avoidance maneuver functionality [33]. A UA may need to 
operate at its CMS limits while generating reasonable 
trajectories that can be performed effectively without 
exceeding dynamic range. The authors in [34] propose a 
receding horizon controller that incorporates obstacle 
avoidance constraints and waypoint selection, and provides a 
framework that takes into account dynamic constraints (e.g., 
turning limits).  Similarly, a UAS control framework 
composed by a trajectory generator and a feedback 
controller was proposed in [35] for obstacle avoidance.  
Research groups have presented diverse state-of-the-art 
approaches that enable impressive UAS maneuverability 
[36]. However, the majority of these approaches are focused 
on adhering to physical limits, and do not consider the 
predictability desired in aircraft avoidance maneuvers in the 
NAS [23, 31]. 
VI. INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Several insights were gained through the development of 
the mock type certification basis.  Firstly, both the UAS type 
and operational concept had to be considered in tandem to 
develop risk-appropriate type certification requirements.  A 
description of relevant aspects of the precision agriculture 
application concept was necessary to fully identify all of the 
hazards to be mitigated by the design of the unmanned 
rotorcraft.  This observation is consistent with EASA’s 
proposed framework for UAS operations [5].   
Hazardous events such as loss of control do not have the 
same consequence for many UAS operations as they do for 
CPA. Hence, conventional standards intended to mitigate 
such events may not apply in the same way (or at all) for a 
UAS.  Reduction in hazards should not be assumed a priori, 
as different operational models have the potential to 
introduce new or different hazards that affect requirements 
for UA systems and equipment. Thus, the operational 
concept for the UAS will have a direct effect on the 
airworthiness requirements, and compliance with these 
requirements affects the economics or practicality of the 
operation. 
Secondly, a key challenge in formulating new 
requirements (including the ‘roll-ups’ as well as the novel 
systems requirements) was attaining the correct level of 
abstraction required to address the necessary safety issues 
while not over-constraining the system design. Additionally, 
tracing individual regulations to the specific hazards they are 
intended to mitigate is non-trivial.  The rolled-up 
requirements for CMS, SI and PSS were intended to aid the 
traceability from requirements to specific hazards and also 
eliminate prescriptiveness.  The goal was to pose 
requirements at a level of detail that addressed the identified 
hazard but allow for design flexibility on the behalf of the 
applicant.   
The third insight involved re-interpreting human-centric 
operational requirements, such as those in 14CFR Part 91, 
into automation requirements supporting airworthiness 
certification, similar to those in 14CFR Part 27. Generally 
speaking, humans require only high-level guidance to safely 
execute tasks such as obstacle avoidance. Training is used to 
supplement these requirements. However, requirements for 
an automated system to replicate a human-centric function 
must be far more explicit. Additional detail is required to 
concretize operational requirements such that they can be 
unambiguously and correctly implemented.  However, care 
must be taken to avoid over constraining the system 
architecture, or imposing a given human-automation 
function allocation. 
The final insight deals with the notion of hazard masking.  
A single regulation may act to mitigate multiple hazards, just 
as multiple regulations may be required to mitigate a single 
hazard. In the research study, the proper implementation of 
the containment function is fundamental to mitigating the 
hazard of vehicle ‘fly-away’.  The use of operational 
procedures, such as clearing the containment area of people, 
acts to mitigate the risk to people within the containment 
area, thereby rendering hull loss within the containment area 
a low-risk event.  Judicious choice of the shape and size of 
the containment volume with respect to the operational 
boundaries can act to mitigate aspects of hull loss relating to 
the ejection of high-energy parts from the containment 
volume.  Thus, while the primary purpose of the 
containment function is to prevent unintended ‘fly-away’, 
the containment system acts to mitigate several additional 
hazards.  This multiple-hazard mitigation (or masking) 
property requires thorough understanding and 
documentation of the effect of a mitigation technique on all 
system hazards, especially in the case of the (future) 
alteration of mitigation.  
In conclusion, the development of risk-centric 
certification requirements for UAS is challenging, even 
when leveraging existing regulations that incorporate 
extensive lessons learned about airworthiness.  The process 
of creating the mock type certification basis for an 
unmanned agricultural rotorcraft provided valuable insights 
that could support larger standards development efforts.  In 
particular, there is a fundamental connection between the 
UAS, its ConOps, and its risk-centric derived certification 
requirements.  Achieving the correct level of abstraction in 
specifying these requirements, whether it be from 
aggregating potentially prescriptive Part 27 requirements, or 
translating human-centric Part 91 operational requirements, 
is a key challenge in attaining a certification basis that 
applies to the broadest possible class of UAS.  
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